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FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTION WITH
REFERENCE TO AIRCRAFT
EDWARD A. HARRIMAN*
The Division of Sovereignty in the United States
The system of dual sovereignty existing under the United
States Constitution presents an infinite variety of legal questions,
and the reports are filled with cases in which these questions have
been decided. The development of a new means of transportation
has added new problems which call for careful consideration.
A State has jurisdiction over all matters within its territory
except in'so far as that jurisdiction has been transferred by the
Constitution to the Federal Government. This territorial sover-
eignty reaches into the air indefinitely.
By Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, "The Con-
gress hereby declares that the Government of the United States
has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete sovereignty
of the airspace over the lands and waters of the United States, in-
cluding the Canal Zone."
It must be noted:
1. That this is merely a declaration of sovereignty, whereas
in Sections 4 and 10, providing for navigable airspace and airspace
reservations, Congress is apparently asserting a property right
in the air, which appears to involve an unconstitutional violation of
the rights of property owners.'
2. That this is a declaration of sovereignty "to the exclusion
of all foreign nations" and therefore does not exclude State sover-
eignty to the extent that such dual sovereignty is provided for by
the Constitution.
*Of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. See 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 346.
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The Uniform State Law contains the following provisions:
Section 7. "All crimes, torts, and other wrongs committed by
or against an aeronaut or passenger while in flight over this
State shall be governed by the laws of this State; and the ques-
tion whether damage occasioned by or to an aircraft while in flight
over this State constitutes a tort, crime or other wrong by or against
the owner of such aircraft shall be determined by the laws of this
State.
Section 8. "All contractual and other legal relations entered
into by aeronauts or passengers while in flight over this State shall
have the same effect as if entered into on the land or water beneath."
These sections appear to be simply declaratory, and in the ab-
sence of such statute, it may be assumed that the same rules would
be applied.
Section 4 of that law contains the following provision:
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this State is
lawful, unless at such low altitude as to interfere with the then ex-
isting use to which the land or water, or the space over the land
or water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be im-
minently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or
waters beneath."
Aeronautics Bulletin No. 18, on page 3, says that regulatory
provisions of State laws are superseded by the Federal Air Com-
merce Act of 1926, in so far as they are inconsistent with it. The
reason for this is that Congress has control of interstate commerce,
and that for the protection of that commerce, the Federal rules
must govern. This doctrine, it seems, must limit not simply Sec-
tion 4, but also Sections 7 and 8 of the Uniform State Law.
When Congress enters a field of regulation within its para-
mount authority, State regulation of that subject-matter is ex-
cluded.
2
At the present time it seems that Section 4 of the Uniform
State Law is controlled by Federal legislation, and that Sections 7
and 8 of that law are partially affected by such legislation, although
in general those sections are in force. The legal relations described
in Sections 7 and 8 are, therefore, in general governed by the law
of the State, but if any provision of Federal legislation is involved
in connection with such relations, such Federal legislation is con-
trolling,
We have, therefore, to consider what provisions of the Con-
2. Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33.
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stitution confer on Congress the power to deal with aircraft and
air traffic. The powers of Congress with reference to this subject
conferred by the Constitution are the following:
1. The power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excise. (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1.)
2. The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. (Art. I,
sec. 8, cl. 3.)
3. The power to establish post offices and post roads. (Art. I,
sec. 8, cl. 7.)
4. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies com-
mitted on the high seas. (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.)
5. The power of legislation with reference to admiralty and
maritime matters conferred by the grant of jurisdiction over such
matters to the Federal Courts. (Art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1.)
6. The power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations. (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.)
7. The power to raise and support armies. (Art. I, sec. 8,
cl. 12.)
8. The power to provide and maintain a navy. (Art. I, sec. 8,
cl. 13.)
9. The power to make rules for the government and regula-
tion of land and naval forces. (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14.)
10. The power to provide for the calling forth of the militia.
(Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 15.)
11. The power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplin-
ing the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be em-
ployed in the service of the United States. (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 16.)
12. The power to make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting the territory or other property of the United States.
(Art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2.)
13. The power to exercise exclusive legislation over the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and over all places purchased by the consent of
the legislature of the State of which the same shall be, for the erec-
tion of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings. (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17.)
14. The power to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment pro-
hibiting the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating
liquors, and the importation and exportation thereof. (Amendment
18, sections 1 and 2.)
These fourteen powers may be classified as follows:
1. The taxing power. (No. 1, supra.)
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2. The commerce power. (No. '2, supra.)
3. The postal power. (No. 3, supra.)
4. The extra-territorial power. (No. 4, supra.)
5. The admiralty power. (No. 5, supra.)
6. The international power. (No. 6, supra.)
7. The military power. (Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, supra.)
8. The power of territorial sovereignty. (Nos. 12, 13, supra.)
9. The prohibition power. (No. 14, supra.)
The Taxing Power
With reference to the Federal taxing power, air traffic presents
no peculiar problems.. There is no legal difference between an ex-
cise tax on the sale of aircraft, and a similar tax on the sale of
automobiles, nor between a tax on transportation by rail and one
on transportation by air. Nor is there any difference between a
Federal tax on gasoline furnished to an automobile and that furn-
ished to an aircraft, whether the owner be an individual or a State.
Nor is there any difference between Federal license tax on a to-
bacco shop and a similar tax on a filling station. In fact aviation
as yet has seemed to present no legal problems with reference to
the Federal taxing power. The question of State taxation as af-
fecting interstate commerce will be discussed hereafter.
U. S. Code, Title 26, Section 1181, provides for the forfeiture
of every vessel, boat, cart, carriage, or other conveyance whatsoever,
used in the removal of for the deposit or concealment of goods
for the purpose of defrauding the internal revenue. This language,
unlike that of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, is broad
enough to cover aircraft.
The Commerce Power
With reference to interstate and foreign commerce, the Federal
Government is supreme, while over intrastate commerce the States
have exclusive jurisdiction. This statement of the law, while ac-
curate, and apparently simple, affords no idea of the difficult legal
problems which actually arise. In the first place, there is a class of
cases where State statutes are held valid in the case of non-action
by Congress. In the second place, State statutes affecting inter-
state commerce have in certain cases been held valid as a per-
missible exercise by the State of its taxing or police power; and
in the third place, State statutes affecting intrastate commerce have
been held invalid in cases where the effect of such statutes was to
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interfere practically with the Congressional plan for the regulation
of interstate commerce. To this situation, already very complicated,
the development of aviation brings new problems no less difficult
than those which have been solved by previous litigation.
Federal regulations regarding interstate commerce may apply:
1. To the aircraft themselves.
2. To the personnel connected with such aircraft.
3. To the navigation of such aircraft.
4. To rates and conditions of carriage of passengers and
freight by air.
5. To the employers' liability of interstate carriers.
6. To the construction and maintenance of airports.
7. To the construction and maintenance of beacons and other
structures for aid in navigation.
8. To the theft of aircraft in interstate commerce.
Federal Licensing and Registration of Aircraft
Present legislation proceeds upon the theory that the Federal
license for an aircraft is necessary only when the aircraft is actually
used in interstate or foreign commerce. This may remain a rule
if the action of the States in aeronautical legislation so co-operates
with the Federal legislation that the dangers of aviation from air-
craft without a Federal license appear negligible. If, on the other
hand, the actual operation in intrastate flights of aircraft not hav-
ing a Federal license should materially interfere with interstate
navigation under Federal license, legislation rendering a Federal
license necessary for all aircraft would doubtless be held constitu-
tional.
The Air Commerce Regulations of June 1, 1928, Section 2
(B), provide that "Whether licensed or not, all aircraft must dis-
play the assigned identification mark." Section 7 is as follows:
"The authority to require identification marks for unregistered air-
craft is derived from Section 3 (e) of the Air Commerce Act of
1926, giving the Secretary authority to ....... " The Federal re-
quirement for identification of aircraft not engaging in interstate
commerce rests on the ground that the nature of interstate air
commerce is such as to require the identification of all aircraft.
The McNary bill provides a system of Federal registration
of sales and mortgages of aircraft registered as aircraft of the
United States.
3. George B. Logan, The Interstate Commerce "Burden Theory" Ap-
plied to Air Transportation, 1 JOURNAL oF Aii LAw 440.
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"The system would doubtless be very useful. Whether it could
wholly supersede the need of recordation under State recording
Acts will present a nice question. The similar provisions con-
cerning ships have been held constitutional by lower courts under
the commerce clause; the aircraft provisions would doubtless go
the same way."'
Federal Licensing of Airmen
The present law and regulations relating to the licensing of
airmen require a license for any person to serve as an airman in
connection with any aircraft registered as an aircraft of the United
States. This is clearly within the power of Federal control over
interstate commerce, but it seems probable that the success of inter-
state commerce by air may require extension of Federal regulation
in this respect. If it ultimately appears that the safety of interstate
air traffic depends upon non-interference with that traffic, by the
action of unlicensed airmen, an extension of Federal control may be
expected and may be justified.5
Federal Control of Air Traffic
Recognizing the air over the United States as a Federal high-
way, Congress has given the Secretary of Commerce authority by
regulation to establish air traffic rules, and has made it unlawful
to navigate any aircraft otherwise than in conformity with such
rules. These Federal rules over-ride any conflicting State rules,
but do not prevent the adoption by States of additional rules which
do not conflict with the Federal rules.
"In the absence of national legislation covering the subject,
a State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for
public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its high-
ways of all motor vehicles-those moving in interstate commerce
as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration
of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor
reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the en-
gines-a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control.
This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized
as belonging to the States and essential to the preservation of the
health, safety and comfort of their citizens; and it does not con-
stitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The
4. A. W. Knauth, Federal Airship's Foreign Commerce Bill, 2 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 205.
5. George B. Logan, supra, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 433, 440.
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reasonableness of the State's action is always subject to inquiry
in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that regard it is
likewise subordinate to the will of Congress. Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U. S. 27, 30, 31 ; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 480; Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 136; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v. New York,
165 U. S. 628, 631; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 392; Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 298;
Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 568; Atlantic
Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 291."8
In Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire Co.,' the Court holds:
1. That a person injured by a violation of the air traffic rfiles,
has a right of action against the wrong-doer.
2. That if the flight were intrastate the Court would still
have jurisdiction on the ground of the violation of the air traffic
rules if it were necessary to apply the 500 ft. minimum altitude
rules to intrastate rights in order to protect interstate movements,
and the failure to prove the necessity for applying that rule to
intrastate movements would merely constitute a failure of proof,
so far as that ground of negligence was concerned, and would not
oust the jurisdiction of the Court.
From a constitutional standpoint, the airspace of the entire
country should be regarded as a single Federal highway, any por-
tion of which may be utilized under Federal authority for inter-
state commerce. The air being a Federal highway, any regulation
for the protection of such highway is within the power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce. Authority is given by the Act to the
Secretary of Commerce to establish civil airways, but this does not
affect the use of the air outside of such airways, nor limit the juris-
diction of Congress over the entire airspace.
It must be noted that Federal legislation does not undertake
to control intrastate commerce by unlicensed aircraft except by
requiring identification marks and compliance with the air traffic
rules. While the airspace of the entire country is a Federal high-
way, the airspace over any State is also a State highway. Federal
legislation controlling such State highways is therefore justified
only so far as may be necessary or reasonable for the regulation
and protection of interstate commerce on the Federal highways.8
By Section 24 of the Judicial Code, U. S. Code, Title 28,
6. Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, at p. 622, 623.
7. 35 F. (2d) 761. See: 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAw, 359.
8. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire Co., 35 F. (2d) 761; 1 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW, 359. See also, G. B. Logan, supra 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 437.
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Section 41, paragraph 8, United States District Courts have juris-
diction "of all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulat-
ing commerce." Under the Air Commerce Act of 1926, and the
Air Commerce Regulations issued by the Department of Commerce
under that Act, the jurisdiction of the United States Courts in
regard to air traffic is very broad. Where the carrier is engaging
in interstate commerce, Federal jurisdiction is clear. Where the
carriage is intrastate, difficult questions will arise. The Federal
jurisdiction conferred by statute is not simply over interstate com-
merce transactions, but over "Suits and proceedings arising under
any law regulating commerce." Can any suit by a passenger on a
flight within the State be said to be arising under any Federal law
affecting commerce? A carrier's duty to the passenger is to ex-
ercise the utmost care. Suppose that the passenger is injured by
the neglect of the carrier to comply with the Federal law. It
would seem that the passenger's suit, in such case, was one arising
under the Federal law regulating commerce. A difference may be
noted between the case of a licensed and an unlicensed aircraft.
The Federal regulations do not require the Federal license for a
carrier carrying persons between two points in one State, unless
part of the flight is over another State, or is part of a through
carriage between points in different States or countries. If the
aircraft has a Federal license, it is governed by the Federal regula-
tions, even though the particular flight is purely intrastate. If it
has not a Federal license, and is not required to have one, it is
governed by the Federal air traffic rules, but not, in general, by
other Federal regulations, except that the identification mark must
be displayed. In the case of intrastate flight by a plane not re-
quiring a Federal license, the Federal Court would appear to have
jurisdiction only in cases where the suit arose out of some violation
of the Federal air traffic rules. In such case, a passenger injured
by some negligence of the carrier not constituting a violation of
the Federal air traffic rules, would be compelled to sue in the
State court unless he could resort to the Federal court upon the
ground of diversity of citizenship.
What has been said in regard to the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral courts must also be borne in mind with reference to the question
of the removal of causes from State courts.
State Taxation of Interstate Air Traffic
The same rules apply here as in other cases of interstate
commerce.
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1. A State may tax property although such property is used
in interstate commerceY
2. While a State may tax property used in interstate com-
merce, it may not tax the use of the property in such commerce.
Hence, a State tax on gasoline used in interstate commerce is un-
constitutional.'o
3. If one is engaged in both interstate and intrastate busi-
ness which are so commingled that a State tax cannot be appor-
tioned between them, the whole tax is unenforceable."
Federal Regulation of Carriage of Passengers and Freight by Air
The regulations require a license for aircraft engaged in com-
mercial traffic in interstate and foreign commerce. Congress has the
same power over such traffic as it has over traffic by rail, but air
traffic has not yet been placed under the control of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
Federal Regulation of Employers' Liability
The respective powers of the Federal and State Governments
regarding the regulation of employers' liability are set forth in the
following decision:
An employee of a railroad company has a right of action against
the company for damages sustained by reason of defective appli-
ances in violation of the Safety Appliance Act even though he
was engaged at the time in intrastate, and not interstate, commerce.
Congress may, in the exercise of plenary power to regulate
commerce between the States, require installation of safety appli-
ances on cars used on highways of interstate commerce irrespective
of the use made by any particular car at any particular time. When
Congress enters a field of regulation within its paramount au-
thority, state regulation of that subject-matter is excluded; and so
held that, without leave of Congress, a State can no more make or
enforce laws inconsistent with the Federal Safety. Act giving redress
for injuries to workmen or travelers occasioned by absence or in-
security of such safety devices than it can prescribe the character
of the appliances.
9. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 456.
10. Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, where four of the Justices found
this distinction too subtle; United States Airways v. Shaw, State Auditor,
43 Fed. (2d) 148; 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 104.
11. Bournwn v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642; United States Air-
ways v. Shaw, supra.
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The right of private action by an employee injured while en-
gaged in duties unconnected with interstate commerce, but injured
by a defect in a safety appliance required by act of Congress, has
such relation to the operation of such act as a regulation of inter-
state commerce that it is within the constitutional grant of authority
to Congress over that subject.12
The liability of common carriers by railroad in interstate or
foreign commerce for injuries to employees is regulated by U. S.
Code, Title 45, Chapter 2.
A similar liability of the employers of seamen is created by
U. S. Code, Title 48, Section 688, which, by reason of the Air
Commerce Act, does not apply to the crew of a seaplane.
How far, if at all, the Longshoremen's and Harbor-workers'
Compensation Act, U. S. Code, Sup. 3, Title 33, Chapter 18, ap-
plies to seaplanes and amphibians, is an interesting question. The
Air Commerce Act of May 20, 1926, section 7, clause (a) is as
follows: "The navigation and shipping laws of the United States,
including any definition of 'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and
including the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be
construed to apply to seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation
of vessels, in relation to seaplanes or other aircraft." The follow-
ing questions then arise:
1. Does the foregoing provision apply to any navigation and
shipping laws enacted after the passage of the Air Commerce Act?
The answer to this is probably in the affirmative.
2. 'Is the Longshoremen's Act a navigation or shipping law?
The answer to this is probably in the affirmative.
3. Assuming affirmative answers to the foregoing questions,
do the terms of the Longshoremen's Act itself affect persons em-
ployed on seaplanes?
To answer this question one must look at the specific provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act itself. Section 904, clauses 3 and 4
define employee and employer as follows:
"The term 'employee' does not include a master of a crew
of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or
unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.
"The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose em-
ployees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock)."
12. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33.
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Section 903 contains the following provision for compensation
with certain limitations following:
"Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect
of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occuring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceed-
ings may not validly be provided by State law."
These specific provisions are broad enough to include the crew
of a seaplane when operating upon the navigable waters of the
United States. This statute is a remedial statute, and the strict
construction of a criminal statute required by the decision of Mc-
Boyle v. United States,"3 is therefore not appropriate. Neverthe-
less it is very doubtful, in view of the Air Commerce Act, if the
Longshoremen's Act could be held to apply to the crew of a sea-
plane. Mr. A. W. Knauth assumes that it does not so apply, and
suggests that either this act or the Federal Employers' Liability Act
should be applied to employees engaged in foreign flights. 14
Whether the omission of any such provision in the McNary
bill now pending indicates a contrary belief on the part of the author
of that bill is not clear.
Federal Control of Airports
Airports are a legal novelty. They have some analogy to
wharves.
"We have said that the reasonableness of wharfage must be
determined by the local law until some paramount law has been
prescribed. By this we mean, that until the local law is displaced
or overruled by paramount legislation adopted by Congress, the
courts have no other guide, no other law to administer on the subject
than the local or State law. Our system of government is of a
dual character, State and Federal. The States retain general
sovereignty and jurisdiction over all local matters within their limits;
but the United States, through Congress, is invested with supreme
and paramount authority in the regulation of commerce with for-
eign nations and among the several States. This has been held
to embrace the regulation of the navigable waters of the United
States, of which the Ohio River is one."'"
"Now wharves, levees, and landing places are essential to
13. 283 U. S. 453, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340 (1931).
14. 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 204.
15. Transportation Company v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691, 700.
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commerce by water, no less than a navigable channel and a clear
river. But they are attached to the land; they are private property,
real estate; and they are primarily, at least, subject to the local
State laws. Congress has never yet interposed to supervise their
administration; it has hitherto left this exclusively to the States.
There is little doubt, however, that Congress, if it saw fit, in case
of prevailing abuses in the management of wharf property-abuses
materially interfering with the prosecution of commerce-might in-
terpose and make regulations to prevent such abuses. When it shall
have done so, it will be time enough for the courts to carry its
regulations into effect by judicial proceedings properly instituted.
But until Congress has acted, the courts of the United States can-
not assume control over the subject as a matter of Federal cog-
nizance. It is Congress, and not the Judicial Department, to which
the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States. The courts can
never take the initiative on this subject." 16
"It is true no act of Congress has relegated the subject of
wharfage to the States, as was done in the case of pilotage; but
this was not necessary; the regulation of wharves belongs prima
facie, and in the first instance, to the States, and would only be
assumed by Congress when its exercise by the States is incompatible
with the interests of commerce; and Congress has never yet as-
sumed to take that regulation into its own hands, or to interfere
with the regulation of the States."'"
"From this view, it is plain that the courts of the United States
have no authority to ignore the State laws and regulations on the
subject of wharves and wharfage, and to declare them invalid by
reason of any supposed repugnancy to the Constitution or laws of
the United States. As already remarked, the courts cannot take
the initiative in this matter. Congress must first legislate before
the courts can proceed upon any such ground of paramount juris-
diction. If the rates of wharfage exacted are deemed extortionate
or unreasonable, the courts of the United States (in cases within
their ordinary jurisdiction) as well as the courts of the States
must apply and administer the State laws relating to the subject;
and these laws will probably, in most cases, be found to be sufficient
for the suppression of any glaring evils."' 8
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Packet Co. v. Aiken,1" and the Minnesota Rate Cases.2 ° It may be
regarded, therefore, that following the analogy of wharves, air-
ports will be held entirely subject to State control until Congress
undertakes to legislate with reference thereto. The only rating
legislation at present is the provision in the Air Commerce Act
of 1926, providing for the rating of air navigation facilities, in-
cluding airports, by the Secretary of Commerce. In case the de-
velopment of air commerce induces Congress to legislate in refer-
ence to airports, their connection with interstate air commerce is
so close that Federal legislation will probably be held paramount to
State statutes. Nevertheless, the analogy between wharves and
airports is not absolute. With reference to wharves, Congress has
jurisdiction to regulate the navigable waters of the United States.
As a wharf exends into such navigable waters, it must be subject
to Federal regulation. An airport, on -the other hand, is part of
the land of the State and while buildings upon it may extend into
the air, they do not extend any higher than other buildings on
other land of the State. It is true that the air is as necessary for
air commerce as are navigable waters for water commerce, but the
right of Congress to control wharves rests upon the fact that they
project into navigable waters, over which the Federal Government
is expressly given jurisdiction; whereas the fact that a building
projects into navigable air clearly confers no right upon Congress
to control its erection on that ground alone. The right of Con-
gress to legislate with reference to airports, therefore, does not
rest upon a jurisdiction over navigable air analogous to its juris-
diction over navigable waters, but upon the fact that the connection
of airports with interstate air commerce is so close that the effective
regulation of such commerce requires regulation of the airports as
well.
It is now regarded that the establishment of airports is a
public purpose, and the power to establish such airports may be
exercised either by State or by Federal authority. For the satis-
factory operation of an airport, zoning may be necessary to restrict
the height of structures in the neighborhood in order to allow
for the take-off and landing of aircraft. The law of zoning is new
and not entirely settled, but F. B. Williams 2 is of the opinion that
there can be no valid zoning regulations especially in the interest
of the airport.
19. 121 U. S. 444.
20. 230 U. S. 352, 405.
21. Harvard City Planning Studies, I, 126.
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The rules laid down in the leading case of Welch v. Swasey,12
do not seem to go quite so far:
"A statute limiting the height of buildings cannot be justified
under the police power unless it has some fair tendency to accom-
plish, or aid in the accomplishment of, some purpose for which
that power can be used; if the means employed, pursuant to the
statute, have no real substantial relation to such purpose, or if
the statute is arbitrary, unreasonable and beyond the necessities
of the case, it is invalid as taking property without due process
of law.
Within the territory of a State the Federal Government has no
general police power.2 8
Nor can the power to regulate interstate commerce be exer-
cised as a general police power, or as a power to control the States
in the exercise of their police power over local trade and manu-
facture.
2 4
To what extent the power to regulate commerce includes an
incidental police power relating only to the "control of the means
by which commerce is carried on," is not clear. Mr. Williams rests
the power of the State to control the height of buildings in the
vicinity of an airport entirely on the idea of zoning for the general
benefit of the community without special reference to the airport;
but if the establishment of an airport facilitating transportation by
air is a public purpose, the establishment of a district in connection
with the airport for the purpose of facilitating air traffic may,
perhaps, be held to be a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. A distinction has been suggested between zoning for public
and for private airports. 25
The Federal Government, of course, has no power to provide
for zoning in a State. The commerce power, however, is broad
enough to give Congress the right to prevent the erection of struc-
tures interfering with commerce by air. What is not clear is the
extent to which such action by Congress may be justified under
the police power incidental to the commerce power, or whether
the commerce power can be utilized to control the construction of
airports and the height of buildings in their vicinity only through
the exercise of the further power of eminent domain. At the
present time the courts would probably be reluctant to extend the
22. 214 U. S. 91.
23. United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall., 41.
24. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251.
25. C. W. Cuthell, The Scope of State Aeronautical Legislation 1 JOUR-
NAL OF Anr LAw, 525.
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police power of the State to the control of the height of buildings
without compensation to the owners of the property, merely for
the purpose of facilitating air traffic, and would be still more re-
luctant to recognize the Federal police power in this connection.
Possible variations in the extent of the police power, however, are
clearly set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble
State Bank v. Haskell :26
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends
to all the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 107 U. S.
518. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage,
or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opin-
ion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.
Among matters of that sort probably few would doubt that both
usage and preponderant opinion give their sanction to enforcing
the primary conditions of successful commerce."
That "the primary conditions of successful commerce" are
being constantly altered by the progress of aviation must be ob-
vious, and the possible effect of such alteration upon future ap-
plications of the doctrine of the police power must be equally
obvious.
2 7
Federal Regulation of the Construction and Maintenance of Beacons
and Other Structures for Aid in Aviation
It is clear that the commerce power is sufficient to authorize
the erection and maintenance of beacons and other structures for
aid in navigation, but that the land on which these structures are
erected must be acquired by the United States, either by purchase,
or by eminent domain. It is equally clear that the commerce
power authorizes Congress to prevent the misuse of beacons and
signal lights in such a manner as to interfere with air traffic, as it
has done in the Air Commerce Act, sec. 11, cl.(e).
It seems probable that the police power of the State is suf-
ficient to sustain State legislation requiring high building to main-
tain some form of light, or warning signal, to prevent danger to
air traffic, and it would seem that the commerce power is broad
26. 219 U. S. 104.
27. A to the present rights ot property owners in the neighborhood of
airports, see: George B. Logan, The Liability of Airport Proprietors, I
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 269; Swetland v. Curtiss, 41 F (2d) 929; 2 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW, 82; Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. (Mass.) 170 N. E. 385;
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 367.
As to intermediate landing-fields, see R. W. Fixel, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW, 486.
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enough to give to Congress similar authority. It is settled by a long
series of decisions that uncompensated obedience to regulations for
public safety under the police power of the State is not a taking
of property without due process of law.2 8
The power to require protection to air traffic by warning signals
on high buildings without compensation is certainly clearer than
the power to limit the height of buildings themselves.
Federal Jurisdiction Over Theft of Aircraft
By virtue of the commerce power, Congress has passed the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, U. S. Code, Title 18, Sec-
tion 408:
"The term 'motor vehicle' when used in this section shall in-
clude an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor-
cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running
on rails; the term 'interstate or foreign commerce' shall include
transportation from one State, Territory, or the District of Col-
umbia, to another State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
or to a foreign country, or from a foreign country to any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia. Whoever shall transport
or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a
motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of
not more than five years, or both. Whoever shall receive, conceal,
store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or
which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign com-
merce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more
than five years, or both. Any person violating this section may be
punished in any district in or through which such motor vehicle
has been transported or removed by-such offender. (Oct. 29, 1919,
c.89, secs. 1 to 5, 41 Stat. 324.)"
The Supreme Court has just decided that this language is not
sufficient to include an airplane. 9
The power of Congress to amend this statute to include air-
craft is obvious.
The Postal Power
The Post Office Department through its airmail contracts has
been the principal factor in developing air traffic in this country.
28. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583.
29. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 453 (1931).
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The constitutional power to establish post roads unquestionably
gives Congress power to establish any number of airways as such
roads, although the airways provided for in the Air Commerce
Act are to be established by the Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of War. It also gives Congress the power to establish
airports for the mail service. It would not require an extraordinary
stretch of the Constitution to uphold action by Congress declaring
the entire navigable airspace of the country a post road.
Control over mail service necessarily involves control over
the incidentals of such service, such as carriage of passengers and
goods in connection with the mail.
The Extra-Territorial Power
Congress is given power to define and punish piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas. The words "on the high
seas" obviously include any action by a seaplane or amphibian
upon the water, or in the airspace in which vessels navigate. Do
these words also include the air over the high seas and above the
airspace in which vessels navigate? In McBoyle v. United States,8
the Supreme Court held that the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act
did not apply to aircraft. The definition in that Act included "an
Automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any
other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails."
The Court says: "Airplanes were well known in 1919, when this
statute was passed, but it is admitted that they were not mentioned
in the reports, or in the debates in Congress.' The Court was
unanimous in its strict construction of this criminal statute, and
when the question ultimately arises, the attempt will undoubtedly be
made to show that the words "on the high seas" do not include
the air over the high seas. In this latter case, however, we are
dealing, not with the criminal statute, but with the constitutional
provision adopted in 1789, when aircraft were unknown. On sound
principles of constitutional construction it seems that the Court will
hold that the words "on the high seas" as used in the Constitution
are broad enough to include the air over the high seas at the present
day.
On the other hand, it is a more difficult question whether the
words "on the high seas," as used in the United States Code,
Title 18, Section 481, et seq, providing for the punishment of piracy
and other offenses are broad enough to include the air above the
30. March 9, 1931, 283 U. S. 453, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340.
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high seas. In McBoyle v. United States, supra, Mr. Justice Holmes
uses the following language:
"Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully con-
sider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do
if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as
possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid
down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of
vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to air-
craft simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies,
or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it,
very likely broader words would have been used. United States v.
Thind, 261 U. S. 204, 209."
Applying this language to the Criminal Code, it would seem
that the rule of conduct as laid down in that Code would evoke
in the common mind only the picture of acts done in vessels on the
water. In construing a statute the same phrase may have differ-
ent meanings when used in different connections."
A fortiori, the same words may have a different meaning in
the Constitution and in the criminal statute. Various interesting
questions arise in this connection. If the strict construction of the
McBoyle case is to be applied, an attack on an airship by another
aircraft would not be within the statute, but an attack on a vessel
by an aircraft would be, because the vessel attacked is on the water.
Whether an attack on an aircraft by a vessel is within the statute,
is more doubtful. In State v. Hall, 2 a person standing in North
Carolina shot another in Tennessee. The defendant was first in-
dicted in North Carolina for the killing, but it was held that the
crime was committed in Tennessee, and that the North Carolina
courts had no jurisdiction to punish him. Under this rule the situs
of the act would appear to be in the air when a vessel attacks an
airship, and the piracy statute would seem to be inapplicable. On
the other hand, a criminal conspiracy is complete where the con-
spiracy is entered into, and a conspiracy to attack an airship might
under certain conditions constitute piracy, as under section 496.
The words "upon the high seas" are used in section 451 of
U. S. Code, Title 18, and have been held under that section to
apply to the open and uninclosed waters of the Great Lakes. 8
31. American Security Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491.
32. 114 N. C. 909.
33. United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249.
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The Admiralty Power
Section 451 of United States Code, Title 18, provides for
the punishment of certain crimes and offenses: "First. When com-
mitted upon the high seas or on any other waters within the ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of
the jurisdiction of any particular State, or when committed within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of any particular State on
board any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United
States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, or
District thereof. Second. When committed upon any vessel reg-
istered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United States,
and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes,
namely: Lake Superior, Lake Ontario, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron,
Lake Saint Clair, Lake Erie, or any of the waters connecting any
of said lakes, or upon the River Saint Lawrence where the same
constitutes the international boundary line." For the reasons above
given in connection with piracy, it may be questioned whether these
provisions apply to crime committed in the air. Moreover, with
reference to the second paragraph referring to crimes on the Great
Lakes, etc., which are also within the territorial jurisdiction of the
States, the Federal jurisdiction here rests entirely on the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and it is questionable
whether such jurisdiction extends into the air above the waters
which are within the territorial jurisdiction of the States. There is
an important distinction to be noticed between the different con-
stitutional provisions involved. There is an express grant of power
to Congress to define and punish piracies and offenses committed
on the high seas. On the other hand, the power to punish offenses
committed on any other waters than the high seas rests upon a
grant of the judicial power to the Federal courts in all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. This grant of judicial power
to the Federal courts operates as an incidental grant of legislative
power to Congress to the same extent.
There is nothing to indicate that the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of England as it existed in 1789, included any juris-
diction over the air, and in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitz-
hugh,'4 the Court says: "At the time the Constitution of the United
States was adopted and our courts of admiralty went into opera-
tion, the definition which had been adopted in England was equally
34. 12 Howard 443, 455.
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proper here." Nevertheless in that case the Court gave a new
definition and held that admiralty jurisdiction under the Constitu-
tion extends to the navigable lakes and rivers of the United States
without regard to the ebb and flow of the tides of the ocean. It
would therefore be perfectly possible, although the step is a longer
one, for the Court to extend the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the Constitution to the air over the waters now included in such
jurisdiction. There is a practical difference, however, between
the extension of such jurisdiction to include the air, and the
extension of the power to define and punish felonies on the
high seas to include the air above the high seas. In the latter case
the extension of such jurisdiction is necessary to insure the punish-
ment of crimes committed in the air above the water, whereas, in
the former case crimes committed in the air above waters within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States are within the
jurisdiction of the State in which such waters lie, and the extension
of the admiralty jurisdiction to include the air above such waters
is therefore unnecessary for the punishment of crimes in general.
It must be noted that in United States v. Rodgers,3 5 the term
'high seas" was held applicable to the open uninclosed waters of the
Great Lakes, and that the Federal Court is therefore held to have
jurisdiction over a crime committed on a vessel belonging to a
citizen of the United States when such vessel is in the Detroit
River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State and within
the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada. With this defini-
tion of the high seas, it seems probable that Congress would have
jurisdiction to define and punish felonies committed in the air
over the Great Lakes upon American aircraft although within the
territorial limits of Canada, but it is not so clear, although en-
tirely possible, that Congress would have similar jurisdiction over
American aircraft flying over the Canadian side of the Detroit
River. The answer to this question depends upon whether the
air is to be assimilated to the waters or not. If it is so assimilated,
jurisdiction of Congress over American aircraft flying over the
Canadian side of the Detroit River would be the same as its juris-
diction over American vessels sailing on the same side of the river.
On the other hand, that portion of the air is clearly Canadian ter-
ritory, and as the whole system of admiralty and maritime juris-
prudence relates entirely to the water, it would require judicial
legislation to extend that jurisdiction to the air above the water
35. 150 U. S. 249.
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belonging to another State. The law of the high seas may reason-
ably justify the application of similar rules to the high air above
the high seas. It is quite another thing to say that the admiralty
jurisdiction of the United States over an American ship in foreign
wafers is sufficient to give similar jurisdiction over American air-
craft in the air above such waters. Here, too, there is room for
a conflict of judicial decision. Suppose that A while on an Ameri-
can aircraft flying over the Canadian side of the Detroit River,
does an act which violates the laws both of Canada and of the
United States, and then escapes to France. Under its extradition
treaties, it may be presumed that Canada could claim the extradition
of the criminal. Whether the United States could also claim extra-
dition is a question in regard to which courts might readily disagree.
It must be noted that the term "high seas" is sometimes used
by writers in a more restricted sense and that the sense in which
the term is used in a particular statement must therefore be care-
fully noted.'
Section 7 (a) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 is as follows:
The navigation and shipping laws of the United States, in-
cluding any definition of 'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and in-
cluding the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be con-
strued to apply to seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation
of vessels in relation to seaplanes or other aircraft."
In Crawford Brothers, No. 2,81 the District Court held that a
Court of Admiralty is without jurisdiction of a suit to establish
and enforce a lien for repairs against an aeroplane which is not a
subject to maritime jurisdiction. As regards aircraft in general,
the decision seems sound. However, a seaplane when afloat is just
as much a vessel as any other ship and is subject to admiralty
jurisdiction.8
It is not stated in the Federal Report above cited whether
the aircraft was an airplane or a seaplane and no distinction is
drawn between the two, but a recent text writer states that the
aircraft in question was a seaplane.8 "
While the Air Commerce Act excludes seaplanes from the
definition of vessel or vehicle under the navigation and shipping
laws, the Air Commerce Regulations, June 1, 1928, Section 74 (J),
contain the following provision:
36. E. g. A. W. Knauth, 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 204.
37. 215 Fed. 269.
38. Reinhardt v. Newport Floating Service Corporation, 233 N. Y. 115;
1928 Aviation Reports, 4.
39. Hotchkiss, Aviation Law, p. 72.
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"Seaplanes on the water shall maneuver according to the laws
and regulations of the United States governing the navigation of
water craft, except as otherwise provided herein."
As regards salvage, a recent writer is of the opinion that, be-
cause the Air Commerce Act of 1926 makes no provision for salv-
age, the right to demand salvage is non-existent.40 It is submitted,
however, that a seaplane in the water is a vessel in fact, while
the Air Commerce Act merely excludes the application to this
particular vessel of the navigation and shipping laws, so that any
statutory provisions regarding salvage will not apply to a seaplane.
But the general doctrine of salvage, being based on the principle of
preventing unjust enrichment and upon a maritime practice centuries
old, should apply in the case of seaplanes as well as. in the case
of any other vessels. The Air Commerce Act recognizes that the
seaplane is a vessel in fact, but, as a matter of policy, retains con-
trol of such seaplane as an aircraft by excluding it from the naviga-
tion and shipping laws. The very laws, however, which by the Air
Commerce Act do not apply to seaplanes as statutes, are made to
apply to their use on water as regulations under Section 74 (J)
of the Air Commerce Regulations, June 1, 1928. For the same
reason the doctrine of general average should apply to seaplanes
while navigating on the water, although statutory provisions with
reference thereto would not apply. It would be entirely reason-
able, by analogy, to apply the same doctrine to air traffic in gen-
eral, but not every judge would be willing to do so. The McNary
bill proposes to apply the doctrine of general average and salvage
to foreign commercial aircraft flights. 1 This bill also provides for
the application to aircraft in foreign commerce of numerous acts
now applicable to shipping.
The International Power
In United States v. Arjona,42 the Court says: "The law of
nations requires every national government to use 'due diligence'
to" prevent a wrong being done within its own domain to another
nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof; and be-
cause of this the obligation of one nation to punish those who within
its own jurisdiction counterfeit the money of another nation has
long been recognized." Just how far this obligation of one nation
to another extends is not clearly settled. Certain obligations of
40. Ibid.
41. A. W. Knauth, supra 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 204.
42. 120 U. S. 479, 484.
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neutrals toward belligerents are generally recognized.4" These ob-
ligations are recognized by the United States and enforced by statu-
tory provisions in U. S. Code, Title 18, Chapter 2. Certain pro-
visions of this chapter relate to vessels. Under the doctrine of
McBoyle v. United States,44 these statutes would seem not to apply
to any aircraft except seaplanes and amphibians. The Court in
Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corporation," holds that a
hydroplane is a vessel when it is in the fulfilment of its function
as a traveller through water. On the other hand, "On Jan. 29,
1915, the Department of State, in opposition to the view of the
German Embassy at Washington, announced the conclusion that
hydro-aeroplanes were not to be regarded as war vessels, and that
Art. VIII of the Hague Convention was not applicable thereto.
American White Book, European War, II, 145-146."'4
It may well be questioned whether this ruling of 1915 would
be followed today.
Although the obligations of neutrality are not clearly defined,
the principle which forbids the fitting out of a vessel of war, such
as The Alabama, in a neutral country for a belligerent seems broad
enough to apply to the fitting out of aircraft in the same manner
for military purposes. Under existing statutes, however, it would
seem perfectly lawful to manufacture and fit out such aircraft, not
suitable for travel on water, so far as the law of the United States
is concerned; so that the present statutes seem defective in not
providing against the fitting out of aircraft for belligerents, with
the result that the United States may be subject to claims against
it for breach of neutrality unless this omission is repaired.
The obligations of a neutral with reference to preventing the
fitting out of vessels appear to be limited to those vessels which
are intended to cruise or carry on war against another power.
"The ability and disposition of a belligerent to utilize for hos-
tile purposes almost any type of merchant vessel capable of mount-
ing guns, serve to impose upon the neutral the burden of exercising
great watchfulness of every vessel constructed within its territory
and contemplating departure therefrom for a belligerent port or
service. The absence of armament at time of departure is by no
means indicative that a vessel may not be specially adapted for
hostile operations. Nor does an apparently innocent structural
43. See Hyde, International Law, Vol. II, §849, et seq.
44. 283 U. S. 453, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340 (1931).
45. 232 N. Y. 115, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 4.
46. Hyde, International Law, Vol. II, §854, Note 1.
47. Ibid., §853.
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design necessarily preclude the likelihood of the transformation of
the ship into a naval auxiliary. ' 48
The difficulties in determining whether aircraft are not adapted
for hostile operations seem even greater than in the case of ships.
The extent of the obligations of one nation to prevent the
taking of any action by persons within its territory for the purpose
of violating the laws of another nation is uncertain. There seems,
for example, to be no admitted liability on the part of one nation
to prevent an attempt by its citizens to smuggle goods into a neigh-
boring country. The constitutional power of Congress to define
and punish offenses against the law of nations, however, is un-
questionably sufficient to sustain any statute forbidding an attempt
in this country to violate a foreign law. It is possible that a claim
by a foreign country against the United States for failure'to pre-
vent such acts might not be sustained, but if Congress recognizes
any obligation of this country toward other countries by forbidding
an attempt in this country to violate the laws of other countries,
it is not for the wrongdoer to say that he is not guilty of an offense
against the law of nations. Under this power, as well as under the
commerce power, therefore, Congress has the right to control the
use of aircraft going to foreign countries.
The Military Power
This power is very broad. Aircraft were unknown in 1789,
but no one would doubt that the power to raise and support armies,
and to provide and maintain a navy includes the power to use air-
craft for military purposes. Obviously the power is broad enough
to include any legislation necessary to protect interference with
military operations by aircraft. Coupled with the commerce power
and the postal power, the military power seems to be sufficient to
render Federal control of the air supreme over that of the States.
By Section 4 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the President
is authorized to provide, by executive order, for the setting apart
and protection of airspace reservations in the United States for
national defense or other governmental purposes. This is an ap-
parent attempt by Congress to appropriate airspace reservations
without compensation, and appears to involve an unconstitutional
taking of property without due process of law.
48. Ibid., §854.
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The Power of Territorial Sovereignty
This power extends:
1. Over all territory or other property belonging to the United
States.
2. Over the District of Columbia.
3. Over all places purchased with the consent of the legis-
lature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.
The power here conferred is that of a territorial sovereign,
and includes absolute control over the air above such territory
subject to the constitutional rights of property owners.
In Section 4 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the President
is authorized to provide, by executive order, for the setting apart
and the protection of airspace reservations in the United States
for national defense and other governmental purposes, and in
addition, in the District of Columbia for public safety purposes.
The last clause shows that Congress with reference to the District
is acting. as territorial sovereign, but is apparently attempting to
take property by the reservation of airspace without compensation,
and therefore without constitutional authority. 9
The Prohibition Power
The Eighteenth Amendment confers upon Congress a power
of control over air traffic broader than that conferred under the
commerce power of the Constitution. The commerce power is thus
defined in Hammer v. Dagenhart.50
"The power is one to control the means by which commerce
is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the assumed right
to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroy it as to par-
ticular commodities. But it is insisted that adjudged cases in this
court establish the doctrine that the power to regulate given to
Congress incidentally includes the authority to prohibit the move-
ment of ordinary commodities and therefore that the subject is
not open to discussion. The cases demonstrate the contrary. They
rest upon the character of the particular subjects dealt with and
the fact that the scope of governmental authority, state or na-
tional, possessed over them is such that the authority to prohibit
is as to them but the exertion of the power to regulate.
49. See 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 346.
50. 247 U. S. 251.
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In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 1 the power
of Congress over the transportation of intoxicating liquors was
sustained. In the course of the opinion it was said:
"'The power conferred is to regulate, and the very terms of
the grant would seem to repel the contention that only prohibition
of movement in interstate commerce was embraced. And the
cogency of this is manifest since if the doctrine were applied to
those manifold and important subjects of interstate commerce
as to which Congress from the beginning has regulated, not pro-
hibited, the existence of government under the Constitution would
be no longer possible.'
"And concluding the discussion which sustained the authority
of the Government to prohibit the transportation of liquor in in-
terstate commerce, the court said: '. . . the exceptional na-
ture of the subject here regulated is the basis upon which the
exceptional power exerted must rest and affords no ground for
any fear that such power may be constitutionally extended to things
which it may not, consistently with the guarantees of the Con-
stitution, embrace.'
Under this ruling it is clear that the commerce power does
not permit the prohibition by Congress of interstate commerce
in non-intoxicating liquors. The Volstead Act, however, does'
prohibit the transportation of beverages containing one-half of one
per cent of alcohol, and the constitutionality of this provision has
been sustained.
Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment Congress had the power to
prohibit interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors. The Eighteenth
Amendment extended this power to interstate commerce. U. S.
Code, Title 27, Section 12, prohibits the transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquors, and Section 40 provides for the seizure and destruction
of the liquor, and the sale of the vehicle. It must be noted that
Section 40, unlike the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, includes
aircraft.
51. 242 U. S. 311.
